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Abstract: Cognitive architectures—task-general theories of the structure and 
function of the complete cognitive system—are sometimes argued to be more akin 
to frameworks or belief systems than scientific theories. The argument stems from 
the apparent non-falsifiability of existing cognitive architectures. Newell (1990) was 
aware of this criticism and argued that architectures should be viewed not as theories 
subject to Popperian falsification, but rather as Lakatosian research programmes 
based on cumulative growth. Newell’s argument is undermined because he failed to 
demonstrate that the development of Soar, his own candidate architecture, adhered 
to Lakatosian principles. This paper presents detailed case studies of the 
development of two cognitive architectures, Soar and ACT-R, from a Lakatosian 
perspective. It is demonstrated that both are broadly Lakatosian, but that in both 
cases there have been theoretical progressions that, according to Lakatosian criteria, 
are pseudo-scientific. Thus, Newell’s defence of Soar as a scientific rather than 
pseudo-scientific theory is not supported in practice. The ACT series of architectures 
has fewer pseudo-scientific progressions than Soar, but it too is vulnerable to 
accusations of pseudo-science. From this analysis, it is argued that successive 
versions of theories of the human cognitive architecture must explicitly address five 
questions to maintain scientific credibility. 
Keywords: Cognitive architecture; ACT-R; Soar; Falsification; Theory development 
1. Introduction 
The past twenty years of research within cognitive psychology has witnessed the development of a 
number of cognitive architectures, such as Soar (Laird et al., 1987; Newell, 1990), ACT-R (Anderson, 
1993; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004), 4-CAPS (Just et al., 1999; Newman et al., 
2003) and EPIC (Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Meyer & Kieras, 1997). These are task-general theories of 
the structure and function of the complete cognitive system. They are general theories of how 
perceptual, cognitive and motor processes interact in producing behaviour, rather than specific theories 
of behaviour on a single task (e.g., the Stroop task) or behaviour in a single functional domain (e.g., 
working memory). Cognitive architectures seek to unify single-task theories by abstracting from those 
theories and specifying general computational or information processing mechanisms that hold across 
tasks. Equally they seek to unify single-domain theories by embedding them within a complete theory 
of cognitive processing. Once developed, a cognitive architecture can then be applied to a specific task 
by providing task-specific knowledge, in much the same way as a general purpose computer can be 
applied to different tasks (word processing, accounting applications, game playing, etc.) through the 
execution of different computer programs.  
While some cognitive architectures have proved to be very successful in providing a task-general 
substrate to support the execution of a wide variety of specific cognitive behaviours (most notably 
ACT-R: Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004), architectures themselves are sometimes 
argued to be more akin to frameworks or even belief systems than scientific theories (e.g., Hunt & 
Luce, 1992; Vere, 1992). Two factors contribute to this view. First, architectures can be used as 
general purpose programming languages to implement single-task theories, sometimes with little 
apparent input from the architecture. Second, architectures cannot be falsified in any simple-minded 
way. Since behaviour on any particular task is held to be the result of the interaction of a task-general 
architecture with task-specific knowledge, potentially falsifying empirical findings can never be 
unambiguously attributed to the architecture and can always be attributed to an erroneous theory of 
how the task is carried out within the architecture. 
Newell (1990), in his presentation of the Soar cognitive architecture, was aware of both of these 
criticisms. With respect to the second, he argued that architectures should not be viewed as theories 
subject to Popperian falsification, but rather should be viewed as Lakatosian research programmes 
with success based on cumulative growth. The issue is one of scientific credibility, for this is what 
falsification is supposed to bring to a theory, and Newell’s appeal to Lakatos is justified in the sense 
that Lakatos (1970) demonstrated that much scientific progress in physics and chemistry did not 
conform to a simple Popperian model of scientific theories being proposed, falsified, and discarded. 
The Lakatosian view is instead that theories develop over time, partly as theoreticians lay out a 
simplified theory and then elaborate its details, and partly in response to the results of empirical 
studies testing the fringes of the theory. 
Newell’s argument, however, is hollow because he failed to demonstrate that the development of Soar, 
his own candidate architecture, adhered to Lakatosian principles. In short, Newell’s appeal to Lakatos 
was not explicitly reflected in the methodology of theory development adopted by the Soar 
community, and appeared to serve little more than to divert the attention of falsificationists. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the apparent rejection of Lakatosian principles in Newell’s later writings 
(Newell, 1992). This paper aims to ground Newell’s appeal to Lakatosian principles in the 
development of cognitive architectures in general and Soar in particular by presenting detailed case 
studies of the development of two cognitive architectures—Soar and ACT-R—from a Lakatosian 
perspective. It is demonstrated that while both are broadly Lakatosian both have also witnessed 
historical developments that, according to strict Lakatosian criteria, are pseudo-scientific. Such 
progressions have been relatively frequent in the case of Soar, so Newell’s appeal to Lakatosian 
principles in defending the scientific credibility of Soar is not supported in practice. The ACT series of 
architectures fares better than Soar under a Lakatosian analysis because a greater proportion of 
theoretical progressions within the ACT series have been scientific. Nevertheless, the ACT series is 
vulnerable to accusations of pseudo-science because some progressions within the series have been 
pseudo-scientific and, while it has adhered to Lakatosian principles, that adherence has been implicit 
rather than explicit. The implication of this analysis is that explicit adherence by the developers of 
ACT to such principles is necessary to maintain the architecture’s scientific credibility and theoretical 
growth. More generally any cognitive architecture must adhere strictly and explicitly to appropriate 
scientific demarcation criteria (such as those of Lakatos, 1970) if it is both to develop as a theory and 
to maintain scientific credibility as it does so. 
2. Critical Features of a Lakatosian Research Programme 
A key area of debate within the philosophy of science in the mid-twentieth century was the 
differentiation between science and pseudo-science. Philosophers were interested in providing 
demarcation criteria that would differentiate scientific thought, such as that generally agreed to 
underlie modern physics and chemistry, from pseudo-scientific thought such as that underlying 
astrology. Popperian falsification (Popper, 1935/1959) has come to be widely accepted (particularly 
outside of the philosophy of science community) as providing a resolution to this debate. According to 
this view, for a theory to be scientific it must, at least in principle, be falsifiable. Any theory that is not 
falsifiable is simply not scientific. Thus, modern physics and chemistry are scientific because they 
involve the generation of predictions and the experimental testing of these predictions. If a theory’s 
predictions are found by empirical work to be wanting, then the theory has been falsified. Astrology is 
a pseudo-science because it does not offer testable predictions and hence does not offer ways in which 
its “theories” may be falsified.  
While falsifiability may be a reasonable aspiration for a theory, Lakatos’ analysis of the history of 
science (Lakatos, 1970) revealed that scientific inquiry did not simply involve the proposal, 
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falsification, and then complete abandonment of scientific theories, as a naïve acceptance of Popperian 
falsification would suppose.1 Rather, Lakatos (1970) observed that there is continuity between theories 
within what he referred to as a “research programme”, with the empirical difficulties of one version of 
a theory generally being dealt with through modification of aspects of that theory, rather than through 
complete abandonment of the theory. 
In order to structure these observations, Lakatos (1970) conceptualised scientific theories as consisting 
of two components: central assumptions and peripheral hypotheses. Central assumptions are 
ontological assumptions to which the theorist is committed (e.g., all cognition is goal-directed). They 
give a research programme (consisting of a series of related theories) its coherence. Peripheral 
hypotheses, on the other hand, form a “protective belt” around the “hard core” of central assumptions. 
They bear the brunt of experimental testing and when empirical anomalies are found, it is the 
peripheral hypotheses, rather than the central assumptions, that are adjusted in order to bring the 
theory into line with observation. Thus theory change within the Lakatosian perspective consists of 
refinement of peripheral hypotheses and gradual incorporation of such hypotheses into the hard core. 
Given this conceptualisation, Lakatos (1970) was able to provide revised (and credible) criteria for 
differentiating between science and pseudo-science. Thus, according to Lakatos’ criteria, change is 
said to be theoretically progressive if “each new theory has some excess empirical content over its 
predecessor” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 118) and empirically progressive if “some of this excess empirical 
content is also corroborated” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 118). A research programme is said to be progressive 
if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive, and degenerating otherwise. Finally, a research 
programme is said to be scientific if it is at least theoretically progressive, and pseudo-scientific 
otherwise. Lakatos (1970) provided several detailed historical case studies to illustrate and justify his 
definitions, including Newton’s theory of gravitation, Prout’s theory of the atomic weight of chemical 
elements, and Bohr’s theory of light emission and the stability of atoms. 
Lakatos’ distinction between scientific and pseudo-scientific research programmes is particularly 
important within the context of demarcation criteria. Importantly, a research programme that is 
theoretically but not empirically progressive is degenerating but still scientific according to Lakatos, 
and a degenerating scientific research programme may prove to be progressive if excess empirical 
content is corroborated at some later date. Thus, according to Lakatos there is no “instant rationality” 
by which we may judge (and condemn) a research programme. Rather, rival research programmes 
compete and this competition is essential to scientific progress (cf. Lakatos, 1970, p. 155). 
3. Soar as a Lakatosian Research Programme 
If Soar is a Lakatosian research programme as Newell (1990) suggests, then it should be possible to 
identify, at each stage of Soar’s development, a set of hard core assumptions and a set of peripheral 
assumptions, with the hard core growing as the theory develops. Once such assumptions have been 
identified, it should also be possible to classify transitions between successive versions of the theory as 
scientific or pseudo-scientific, and if scientific, as progressive or degenerating. This section aims to 
perform these identifications and classifications. 
It must be acknowledged at the outset that there is an element of judgement in the historical 
assessment of theoretical revisions as theoretically or empirically progressive, and therefore as 
scientific or pseudo-scientific. This is inevitable given that Soar has not previously been stated in 
                                                     
1 Popper’s view of science was of course considerably more sophisticated. Falsification was proposed in contrast 
to induction, which was advocated by the then dominant logical positivist view of science. Popper was also 
concerned with the problem-solving character of science and the growth of human knowledge through 
conjecture and refutation. His concern was, however, more with what could or should prompt a theory to be 
revised or replaced, rather than how theories change in response to apparently falsifying evidence. 
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terms of hard core assumptions and peripheral hypotheses. The judgements expressed here therefore 
attempt to favour Soar wherever possible.2 
3.1. A Brief History of Soar 
According to Laird & Rosenbloom (1996), who provide a detailed history of the development of Soar, 
the goal of the initial Soar theory (circa 1982, and henceforth referred to as Soar1) was to provide a 
uniform mechanism for problem solving in which multiple “weak methods” (i.e., domain-general 
problem solving heuristics, such as hill-climbing and means-ends analysis) could be combined in a 
seamless fashion and as dictated by task requirements. A key concept in this endeavour was that of the 
problem space, in which problem solving involves a series of steps that transform an initial state into a 
goal state (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972). Each problem solving step is conceptualised as the 
application of an operator to a representation of the current state. Problem solving then amounts to a 
cyclic process of determining the set of operators available given a state, and selecting and applying 
one of the available operators, with problem solving terminating when the representation of the current 
state corresponds to a goal state. 
The Soar theory has never been defined as a set of assumptions (indeed, Newell, 1992, argues strongly 
against such an approach), but the twin assumptions of a uniform problem solving mechanism and 
problem solving as traversal of a problem space, together with the representational assumption that all 
knowledge is represented in a uniform symbolic/propositional form, would seem to correspond to the 
hard core of Soar1. Indeed these assumptions are still present in the most recent version of Soar 
(Soar8: Wray & Laird, 1998). Soar1 also included a number of additional assumptions which have the 
flavour of peripheral hypotheses: that problem solving consists of a sequence of decisions, with the 
objects of those decisions being problem spaces, states or operators; and that each decision is the 
product of a processing cycle consisting of two phases. In phase one (the elaboration phase), 
representations for alternative problem spaces, states and operators are created, and “votes” are cast 
for the alternatives. In phase two (the decision phase), the votes are totted up and the winner is 
selected and installed as the outcome of the decision. A production system was used to implement the 
mechanism by which representations were created and votes cast. 
Soar2 built on Soar1 by incorporating a mechanism for automatic goal creation and revising the 
system of voting. The mechanism for automatic goal creation, universal subgoaling (Laird, 1984; cited 
in Laird & Rosenbloom, 1996), was the product of a new peripheral hypothesis: that all goals are 
created by the architecture in response to a blockage (or impasse) in problem solving, with the object 
of such a goal being to resolve the impasse. The revised voting system replaced votes with 
preferences, which indicated the absolute or relative worth of the objects of decisions (so a preference 
might state that operator1 is worst, or that operator2 is better than operator3). This change to the 
architecture therefore involved a change to a peripheral hypothesis of Soar1. Soar2 also arguably saw 
the incorporation of one peripheral hypothesis of Soar1 into the theory’s hard core: in Soar1 the 
processing cycle, yielding a sequence of decisions and consisting of alternate elaboration and decision 
phases, was simply a way of implementing problem space traversal. In Soar2 it was critical in the 
formulation of universal subgoaling. 
Soar2 was able to solve a wide range of tasks using a range of methods by applying knowledge 
flexibly within a uniform framework. It was not, however, able to learn from its problem solving 
experience. Rosenbloom (1983; cited in Laird & Rosenbloom, 1996) developed a learning 
mechanism—chunking—that was compatible with Soar2, and this was incorporated into the 
architecture in what eventually became Soar3. Chunking is intimately related to subgoaling. An 
impasse in problem solving triggers the creation of a subgoal. The impasse is resolved (and the 
subgoal completed) when further problem solving within the subgoal leads to the creation of a 
                                                     
2 Similar remarks apply to the judgements later in this paper of progressions in the ACT series as theoretically 
and/or empirically progressive. 
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preference that breaks the impasse. The chunk summarizes the processing within the subgoal in the 
form of a new production rule whose conditions are the conditions that led to the impasse and whose 
actions are the creation of the preference that resolved the impasse. Chunking was effectively an 
additional peripheral hypothesis in Soar3. Its dependence on the universal subgoaling hypothesis and 
the production system substrate suggests that universal subgoaling and the production system substrate 
had, by this time, become hard core assumptions. 
By 1986 a community of researchers interested in Soar had begun to develop, and the next version of 
Soar, Soar4, was concerned with consolidating Soar’s computational implementation for public 
release rather than advancing it theoretically. Numerous minor changes were made, perhaps the most 
notable of which involved refinements to the variety and interpretation of available preferences, 
suggesting that whilst universal subgoaling was a hard core assumption, the details of its 
implementation where not finalized. Chunking appears to have developed by this stage from a 
peripheral hypothesis into a hard core assumption. 
In all versions of Soar prior to 1989 application of an operator led to the creation and subsequent 
selection of a new state. This was inefficient since the new state was typically created by copying 
many features of the prior state. It was also psychologically implausible as it meant that, if a sequence 
of states were created within a subgoal, then each of those states would remain accessible until the 
subgoal was resolved (Newell, 1990). Psychological evidence (in the form of the progressive 
deepening problem solving heuristic: Newell & Simon, 1972) suggests that people are only able to 
maintain a representation of one state for any goal at a time. Soar5 addressed this issue by introducing 
the concept of destructive state modification and the single state principle. In Soar5 there was a single 
state associated with each goal, and operator application involved modifying that state, rather than 
creating a new state. The use of a single modifiable state for the top-level goal also meant that Soar5 
could more easily and reliably interact with the external environment than previous versions of the 
architecture. 
The single state principle qualifies as a new peripheral hypothesis in Soar5, but its implementation was 
far from straightforward, and many significant modifications to Soar’s low-level implementation 
details were made in order to support the principle. Thus, the interpretation of production rules was 
changed to support a system that combined truth maintenance (where a production’s actions could be 
reversed if its conditions subsequently became false) with persistent state changes (where certain state 
modifications were irreversible), the use of preferences was extended from the distinguished problem 
solving elements (problem spaces, states and operators) to all attributes of these elements in Soar’s 
working memory, and a further type of preference (for triggering reconsideration of selected problem 
spaces, states and operators) was added. The status of these additional changes is unclear. Cooper et 
al. (1996) demonstrate that they are not necessary consequences of the assumptions in Soar4 
combined with the single state principle. A conservative position is that the additional assumptions 
should be treated as further peripheral hypotheses of Soar5. 
1992 saw the release of Soar6, which, like Soar4, was the product of consolidation rather than 
theoretical advance. Soar6 addressed issues of concern to the Soar user community (scalability and 
maintainability of the software), and corrected some minor conceptual problems with the interaction 
between Soar5’s truth maintenance system and its chunking mechanism, but it contained no new 
theoretical content. However, improved scalability of the software opened up new areas of 
investigation within the Soar community, including real-time control of flight simulators (Pearson et 
al., 1993) and interactive natural language processing (Huffman & Laird, 1993). 
One conceptual difficulty with versions of Soar prior to 1994 was a mismatch between the problem 
space level, whereby problem solving was described in terms of transforming an initial state into a 
goal state by the application of operators, and the symbol level, where problem space functions were 
implemented by production rules. The Soar architecture did not prevent users from specifying 
production rules at the symbol level that violated the spirit of the problem space level. This, and 
efficiency concerns, led to the development of the New New Problem Space Computational Model 
(NNPSCM: Laird & Huffman, 1994), a theoretical proposal which, together with constraints on the 
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form of production rules at the symbol level, ensures a tight mapping between the problem space level 
and the symbol level. 
Soar7 adopted the NNPSCM and constraints on the form of production rules. It retained the basic 
decision cycle of previous versions of Soar, but all decisions were concerned with operators: problem 
space and state decisions were eliminated because within the NNPSCM problem spaces and states are 
unique to a goal. The outcome of the Soar7 decision cycle was either selection and application of an 
operator to the current state, or an impasse and the subsequent creation of a sub-state. Adoption of the 
NNPSCM reflected a significant conceptual change in Soar, but the hard core assumptions of earlier 
versions remained, and a key peripheral hypothesis of Soar5—the single state principle—was 
incorporated into the hard core. 
In 1998 Soar7 was superseded by Soar8. The main rationale for Soar8 was to overcome problems in 
ensuring consistency of state information during subgoaling (Wray & Laird, 1998). Essentially, these 
problems stemmed from interactions between the implementation of the single state principle and the 
NNPSCM, but the revisions actually amounted to significant simplifications. Preferences for all 
working memory elements apart from operators, for example, were eliminated, as were preferences to 
force reconsideration of a previous decision. The resulting system has more in common with Soar4 
(augmented with the single state principle and a hierarchical truth maintenance system) than Soar5, 
Soar6 or Soar7. 
One last development of Soar merits special mention. Chong & Laird (1997) describe EPIC-Soar, an 
offshoot of the Soar project obtained by interfacing the central production system component of Soar7 
with the peripheral perceptual and motor subsystems of EPIC (Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997). While EPIC is a complete architecture in its own right, its semi-modular peripheral 
components incorporate assumptions regarding the detailed timing of perceptual and motor 
subsystems, and EPIC-Soar was developed in order to allow Soar to model the executive control 
processes required by a complex dual-task situation (the Wickens task: Martin-Emerson & Wickens, 
1992). At the time of writing, EPIC-Soar and Soar8 are separate systems, but the systems are 
compatible and their future merger would seem likely.  
3.2. Progressive and Degenerating Steps in the Development of Soar 
The preceding analysis of the development of Soar in terms of hard core assumptions and peripheral 
hypotheses is plausible but somewhat artificial. Soar has not previously been stated in terms of a set of 
assumptions independent of an implementation. There is good reason for this. The above assumptions 
are abstract and even vague. They would not support the kind of detailed computational work that has 
been carried out using Soar over the last two decades. However, and as argued above, if Newell’s 
(1990) use of Lakatos as a defence against the Popperian falsificationists is to have force, then an 
analysis such as the above must be provided. Equally it must be possible to demonstrate that 
theoretical developments have been scientific rather than pseudo-scientific. 
Recall the Lakatosian definition of a progressive step in scientific theory development: A step is 
progressive if the resulting theory makes new predictions (i.e., it is theoretically progressive), at least 
some of which are corroborated (i.e., it is also empirical progressive). Given appropriate task 
knowledge, the principal feature of Soar2, automatic subgoaling, makes predictions about the 
situations in which subgoals are created. It is therefore theoretically progressive (and scientific). For it 
to be empirically progressive it must be possible to detect when the human cognitive system creates 
subgoals. There is no background observational theory that allows us to do this, so the step cannot be 
empirically progressive. 
The step from Soar2 to Soar3 is also theoretically progressive, because the inclusion of chunking as a 
learning mechanism makes predictions about changes in task performance with experience. Some of 
these predictions (e.g., the power law speed up of reaction time in the Seibel (1963) 1023-choice 
reaction task: see Rosenbloom & Newell, 1986) have received empirical corroboration, so this step is 
also empirically progressive. Furthermore, the predictions from chunking within a particular task 
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depend in part on the decomposition of a task into subgoals, so learning data also provide indirect 
empirical support for the earlier Soar1 to Soar2 transition. 
The next major step, the addition of destructive state modification and the single state principle to 
Soar4 to yield Soar5, is also theoretically progressive because it makes predictions about how states 
evolve during the execution of a task and in response to interaction with external environments. The 
minutia of these predictions cannot be tested without a theory of how the content of states might be 
determined.3 However the progressive deepening problem solving strategy may be seen as 
corroborating evidence for the single state principle. A charitable interpretation of the transition to 
Soar5 is therefore that it is both theoretically and empirically progressive. This interpretation is 
charitable for at least two reasons. First, progressive deepening is not a true prediction of Soar5—it is 
an anomaly of Soar4 specifically addressed by modifications in Soar5. In discussing scientific 
explanation and theory growth, Lakatos argues that “a given fact is explained scientifically only if a 
new fact is also explained with it” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 119). Given this, the transition to Soar5 would 
only qualify as scientific if it made predictions beyond progressive deepening. Second, there are many 
differences between Soar4 and Soar5 that are independent of the assumptions and hypotheses leading 
to progressive deepening, such as the extensive revisions to the preference semantics and the 
introduction of impasses on non-context state elements. These assumptions do not appear to lead to 
predictions beyond those of Soar4. Cooper & Shallice (1995) provide a more detailed examination of 
the Soar4 to Soar5 progression, and come to a less charitable conclusion. 
Subsequent major theoretical developments (Soar6 to Soar7 and Soar7 to Soar8) have modified the 
predictions of Soar5 about the evolution of states (and led to a simpler theory), but have not led to 
additional predictions. They have therefore been neither theoretically nor empirically progressive. In 
addition it remains the case that the predictions of Soar concerning the evolution of states cannot be 
tested with current means. Consequently developments since Soar5 have been neither theoretically nor 
empirically progressive. This situation could change, however, if some additional theory or approach 
were developed that would allow the content of mental states to be determined (and thereby compared 
with Soar predictions). 
One theoretical development remains to be considered: EPIC-Soar. Here the assessment is more 
positive. EPIC-Soar is a theoretically progressive development of Soar7 because it makes additional 
predictions (e.g., in the Wickens task: see Chong & Laird, 1997). It is also empirically progressive 
because some of those predictions have been corroborated. The transition from Soar7 to EPIC-Soar is 
therefore clearly scientific according to Lakatosian criteria. 
3.3. Conclusion 
Newell (1990) suggested that the evolution of Soar was Lakatosian. The above analysis suggests that 
this is true, but the development of the theory has not been consistently progressive. Indeed, if one 
applies Lakatosian criteria in the most liberal of fashions, only two transitions have been genuinely 
progressive (i.e., both theoretically and empirically progressive). (See Figure 1, left.) One of the 
remaining transitions is scientific but degenerating, since predictions resulting from it could not be 
directly corroborated. More worryingly, however, many of the most recent progressions are pseudo-
scientific in Lakatosian terms. This may in part reflect the current preoccupations of the Soar 
community, which, with the exception of the work of Chong & Laird (1997), are dominated by 
technical and engineering applications (e.g., Jones et al., 1999) rather than cognitive scientific 
concerns relating to the human cognitive architecture. However, the lack of empirical grounding in the 
majority of recent theoretical progressions undermines the scientific credibility of the Soar research 
programme. 
                                                     
3 Protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) provides the only current theory for determining the content of 
mental states during problem solving, but the theory does not yield the kind of detailed data necessary to support 
or falsify the predictions of Soar5. 
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4. The ACT Series as a Lakatosian Research Programme 
Figure 1: The development of Soar and the ACT series of architectures. Major differences between 
successive theories are shown to the left of each arrow. Whether the progression was theoretical or
empirically progressive (T.P. and E.P. respectively) is shown to the right of each arrow. 
 
While there are numerous theoretical proposals concerning the structure of the human cognitive 
architecture, only one, the ACT-R architecture of Anderson and colleagues (see, e.g., Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004) has a discernable history comparable in length to that of Soar 
(cf. Anderson & Bower, 1973; Anderson, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Anderson, 1993; Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004). Like Soar, ACT-R is not directly falsifiable. Behaviour on any 
task is argued to be the product of ACT-R operating with task knowledge, so any differences between 
observed behaviour and that of an ACT-R model may be due to errors in the specification of task 
knowledge. ACT-R is therefore subject to the falsifiability problem, and adherence to Lakatosian 
principles is an appropriate response to this problem. 
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4.1. From HAM to ACT-R: A Brief History 
Work on the ACT series of architectures dates back to Anderson & Bower’s HAM theory of Human 
Associative Memory (Anderson & Bower, 1973). HAM had numerous strengths in, for example, 
predicting response times in some memory experiments, but it also made some false predictions, and 
the theory was limited in scope to the memory domain. Anderson (1976) developed ACT—Adaptive 
Control of Thought—in an effort to address simultaneously some of the empirical weaknesses of 
HAM and phenomena from domains such as inference, language comprehension and language 
generation. The formulation of ACT was constrained by what Anderson (1976) referred to as 
“preconceived notions”. These may be identified with ACT’s hard core. These assumptions were: that 
cognition is the outcome of parallel processing; that there is a separation between declarative and 
procedural knowledge; that declarative knowledge is non-erasable, non-ambiguous, referential in 
character, and takes the form of propositions comprising predicates applied to subjects; and that 
procedural knowledge consists of simple modular units, the application of which is data driven and the 
acquisition of which is by doing (see Anderson, 1976, pp. 115–122). 
Anderson (1976) was clear that these preconceived notions did not constitute a complete theory. He 
continued by fleshing out the notions into 11 assumptions that formed the basis of the implementation 
of ACT.4 Thus, declarative knowledge was assumed to be represented in a network of linked nodes 
similar to the original HAM theory, while procedural knowledge was assumed to be represented by 
condition-action production rules with conditions that might match declarative memory and actions 
that specified a sequence of changes that might be made to that memory. These fleshing out 
assumptions are peripheral assumptions in the Lakatosian sense. Other peripheral assumptions related 
to concepts such as activation of declarative memory nodes (which in the 1976 ACT theory was an all-
or-nothing concept), spreading of activation within declarative memory along weighted links, periodic 
dampening of activation within declarative memory to prevent activation growing without bound, 
strength of productions within procedural memory and algorithms for selecting, applying and 
strengthening such productions. 
ACT successfully addressed some of the weaknesses of HAM concerning memory phenomena. It also 
demonstrated how a single set of principles could be applied to phenomena from a range of cognitive 
domains (memory, induction, language processing, etc.). However once again the theory had several 
acknowledged weaknesses. The all-or-nothing character of activation, for example, did not sit well 
with evidence from a range of tasks pointing to continuous levels of activation, and the theory was 
silent on the issue of procedural learning. Some of these weaknesses were addressed with the 
development of ACT*, which Anderson (1983) presented as an instantiation of the ACT framework. 
ACT* shared the preconceived notions of ACT (as described above), but differed in the way those 
notions were fleshed out. This reinforces the status of Anderson’s “preconceived notions” as hard core 
assumptions. At the same time, most peripheral hypotheses of ACT were modified in the transition to 
ACT*. 
Anderson (1983) stated ACT* as a set of 14 assumptions, paralleling the original 11 assumptions of 
ACT (Anderson, 1976). Only two key peripheral hypotheses remained intact—that a production 
system component operated on the system’s declarative knowledge representation, and that the 
productions took the form of condition-action pairs with conditions matching features of declarative 
memory and actions creating or strengthening declarative memory elements. These are the only 
peripheral hypotheses of ACT that might reasonably be considered additional hard core assumptions 
of the ACT series circa 1983. Indeed, these “peripheral” hypotheses have been a central feature of all 
                                                     
4 In fact, it was the implementation of ACTE, the fifth instantiation of the ACT theory, that was reported in 
Anderson’s 1976 book. 
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instantiations of the ACT theory. If they were not hard core assumptions of the original 1976 theory, 
then they have become so since.  
The key innovations in the other peripheral hypotheses of ACT* relate to the introduction of 
continuous activation levels for declarative memory elements, the use of distinguished goal elements 
and a goal stack to control or direct processing, and principles for the acquisition and modification of 
procedural knowledge units (i.e., productions). The first of these revises the discrete activation 
hypothesis of ACT (a hypothesis which can be thought of as an initial approximation), the second 
systematizes serial control, which was unconstrained in ACT, and the third addresses procedural 
learning, an acknowledged weakness of ACT. Further peripheral hypotheses concern the structure of 
declarative memory and the procedure for selecting productions for application. 
It is worth noting that each of the three key innovations discussed in the preceding paragraph is 
independent in the sense that a consistent theory could have been produced from ACT by the addition 
of any subset of the three. Indeed, Anderson (1987) presents a slightly revised version of ACT* that 
includes a simplified theory of the acquisition of procedural knowledge. The 1983 ACT* theory 
proposed that procedural knowledge was acquired through a variety of architectural mechanisms 
including generalization (in which a condition of two otherwise identical productions could be 
removed allowing the productions to be merged) and discrimination (in which a condition might be 
added to a production which had proved to be overly general). Anderson (1987) rejects generalization 
and discrimination on the grounds that a) there is no clear empirical evidence to support automatic 
generalization or discrimination, and b) similar effects may be obtained using other production 
acquisition mechanisms within ACT* combined with suitable productions encoding reflective learning 
strategies. 
A major step in the development of the ACT series came with Anderson’s adoption of rational 
analysis. Anderson (1990) argued that much if not all of human cognition could be understood in 
terms of an optimal adaptation to the environment. The relation between rational analysis and the ACT 
series was initially unclear, but by 1993 Anderson had incorporated his principles of rational analysis 
into the ACT framework, yielding ACT-R (or more precisely, ACT-R 2.0: Anderson, 1993). ACT-R 
2.0 builds on the hard core of ACT*. Thus, it retains the assumption of a procedural/declarative 
distinction, with the procedural component taking the form of a production system working on the 
declarative component. ACT-R 2.0 also retains the concepts of quantitative activation of units in 
declarative memory, quantitative production strength in the procedural memory, and goal-directed 
processing—assumptions that appear to have migrated to the hard core of the theory. 
One set of key differences between ACT-R 2.0 and ACT* concerns the equations that govern 
declarative knowledge activation and production strength. In ACT* the equations for the former are 
based on spreading of activation from related knowledge units coupled with temporal decay and for 
the latter on previous successful applications. In ACT-R 2.0 the equations are justified by the 
principles of rational analysis and derived from statistical and temporal features of the use of 
declarative knowledge units and productions. Rational analysis is also employed in ACT-R 2.0’s 
mechanism for production selection, which depends on the expected probability that a production will 
achieve the current goal, the value of the goal, and the expected cost of achieving the goal using the 
production. One further difference of note between ACT* and ACT-R 2.0 concerns the mechanisms 
available for production acquisition. ACT-R 2.0 does away with production composition. Instead, 
productions are acquired through a process of analogy with declarative knowledge and the subsequent 
compilation of this knowledge into procedural knowledge. 
ACT-R 4.0 (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) refines several aspects of ACT-R 2.0. For example, it 
imposes limitations on the structure of chunks, the form of productions, and the execution time of 
production actions. These limitations mean that ACT-R 4.0 productions are more “fine-grained” than 
those of earlier versions of the theory. A wide range of further innovations are introduced in ACT-R 
4.0, including “partial matching” (whereby a production that almost matches working memory may be 
incorrectly selected, allowing for error), a modified mechanism for production selection (which in 
ACT-R 4.0 is based initially on matching the top-most goal on the goal stack), a prohibition on 
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simultaneous matching of multiple production instantiations, scoping rules that affect the estimation of 
production utility parameters, and revisions to the mechanism of production compilation that enables 
declarative learning (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998, pp. 431–439). Many of the changes reflect 
modifications to peripheral hypotheses of the research programme. They emphasize that the details of, 
for example, production selection and learning are still fluid, and while rational analysis is clearly a 
hard core assumption of ACT-R 4.0, the rational analysis assumption combined with the hard core of 
ACT* does not uniquely determine numerous aspects of the theory. 
ACT-R continues to evolve. The most recent version, ACT-R 5.0 (Anderson et al., 2004), is more 
modular than previous members of the ACT family. At the same time it attempts to address an even 
wider variety of phenomena. ACT-R 5.0 shares the hard core assumptions of ACT-R 4.0, but includes 
several additional peripheral hypotheses. Specifically, ACT-R 5.0 includes modules for intention 
setting, declarative memory recall, visual processing and motor control. These modules interact 
through a series of dedicated buffers with a central production system component that is based closely 
on ACT-R 4.0. ACT-R 5.0 is an attempt to take seriously issues arising from interaction with the 
environment, and the perceptual and motor modules draw heavily on the corresponding modules in the 
EPIC architecture (Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Kieras & Meyer, 1997), in a manner not dissimilar to that 
of EPIC-Soar. One of the key new domains to which the resulting architecture has been applied is that 
of psychological refractory period (PRP) effects, and Byrne & Anderson (2001) have demonstrated 
good fits between the behaviour of ACT-R 5.0 PRP models and human behaviour in both simple 
reaction time PRP tasks and more complex cognitive PRP-like tasks. 
Major differences between ACT-R 4.0 and the central component of ACT-R 5.0 concern the 
structuring of goals and the mechanism for production acquisition. Anderson appears never to have 
been comfortable with an architecturally specified goal stack of unlimited depth. With respect to 
ACT*, for example, he suggested that “it might be reasonable to assume that three to five goals are 
available […] The rest of the goals, however, will have to be retrieved from long-term memory if they 
are to be had at all.” (Anderson, 1983, p. 161: see also Anderson, 1993, p. 136, for comments 
concerning the goal stack in ACT-R 2.0). ACT-R 5.0 assumes a goal buffer capable of holding a 
single goal, with super-ordinate goals reconstructed from declarative or procedural memory where 
necessary (following suggestions by Altmann & Trafton, 2002). Similarly, the mechanisms for 
production acquisition within the ACT series have been a constant source of flux. ACT-R 5.0 employs 
a restricted form of production composition, in which two productions that fire in sequence can under 
some conditions be merged into a single production (Taatgen & Anderson, 2002). The mechanism is 
similar to the production composition mechanism of ACT*, but is dependent on the modular structure 
of ACT-R 5.0 and absent from earlier versions of ACT-R. ACT-R 5.0 also attempts to address neuro-
imaging data by including a mapping of architectural components to brain regions. 
4.2. Progressive and Degenerating Steps in the ACT Series 
As in the case of Soar, adopting the Lakatosian perspective on theoretical change allows steps in the 
development of the ACT series to be categorized as theoretically progressive, empirically progressive, 
degenerating, or pseudo-scientific. The first step, HAM to ACT, is theoretically and empirically 
progressive. It is theoretically progressive because HAM makes no predictions beyond the domain of 
memory. ACT has broader scope, so (when supplemented with suitable productions) it makes 
predictions above and beyond those made by HAM. It is empirically progressive because some of the 
additional predictions (e.g., relating to interactions between memory and induction: Anderson, 1976, 
pp. 355–375) have been corroborated. 
The step from ACT to ACT* (circa 1983) is also theoretically and empirically progressive. ACT 
makes no predictions about priming effects on reaction time, goal directed behaviour or procedural 
learning. ACT* makes predictions in all three of these areas. Continuous activation levels, for 
example, allow accounts to be given of priming effects (Anderson, 1983, pp. 96–106) and of effects in 
letter and word perception (Anderson, 1983, pp. 152–155). Assumptions about goal structuring allow 
accounts to be given of complex goal-oriented behaviour, such as problem solving and planning 
(Anderson, 1983, pp. 156–169). Finally, the mechanism of production compilation allows one to 
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provide an ACT* account of procedural learning in domains such as high-school geometry (Anderson, 
1983, pp. 215–260). The predictions in each of these three areas have been corroborated, so again 
theoretical progress is matched by empirical progress. 
The preceding positive assessment of the transition to ACT* depends upon an acceptance of the ACT* 
predictions as genuine predictions, and not post-hoc rationalizations. A more critical review could 
argue that pre-existing empirical anomalies drove the reshaping of ACT, and consequently that the 
step to ACT* was not empirically progressive. (Recall Lakatos’ assertion that a given fact is explained 
scientifically only if another fact is explained with it.) The scientific credibility of the progression to 
ACT* would also have been strengthened if predictions could have been made based on interactions 
between the new peripheral hypotheses of ACT*. More critically, the apparent independence of the 
hypotheses, and the lack of any predictions resulting from their interaction, partially undermines the 
status of ACT* as a genuinely integrative theory of cognition. 
The 1987 revision of ACT* (which involved reducing the number of ways in which procedural 
knowledge could be acquired) was a theoretical simplification, arguably reflecting significant insight, 
but it led to no new predictions. From a strict Lakatosian perspective the 1987 revision is therefore 
neither theoretically nor empirically progressive, and so represents a pseudo-scientific step. However, 
as in the case of simplifying progressions in the Soar research programme, this assessment seems 
overly harsh. The progression did not introduce new assumptions without motivation. Rather, it 
eliminated some assumptions once it was clear that learning data could be accounted for with only a 
subset of the original assumptions. 
Anderson (1990) argues that rational analysis predicts many behavioural phenomena in domains such 
as memory recall, causal inference and categorization. ACT-R 2.0, with its adoption of the principles 
of rational analysis, inherits many of the (corroborated) predictions of rational analysis. These 
predictions go beyond those offered by ACT*. ACT-R 2.0 thus appears to represent a progressive 
development of ACT*. However, the transition from ACT* to ACT-R 2.0 must be interpreted with 
caution. First, Anderson (1990) suggests that many of the predictions that follow from rational 
analysis are independent of cognitive architecture (and hence independent of the ACT framework). 
This implies that some of the progressive aspects of ACT-R 2.0 could be achieved by merging rational 
analysis with some other architecture (e.g., Soar). Second, it is unclear if ACT-R 2.0 inherits all of the 
empirical content of ACT* (and hence whether ACT-R 2.0 is empirically progressive). For example, 
some corroborated empirical content of ACT* relates to learning, yet the learning mechanisms 
embodied in ACT-R 2.0 differ substantially from those in ACT*. 
The transition from ACT-R 2.0 to ACT-R 4.0 is more clearly theoretically and empirically 
progressive. It is theoretically progressive because the introduction of constraints on declarative and 
procedural memory, and more critically the adoption of a default timing estimate for production 
actions, ensures that ACT-R 4.0 makes predictions that go beyond those of ACT-R 2.0. ACT-R 4.0 
has also been applied in many more tasks than ACT-R 2.0 (ranging from arithmetic and acquiring 
numerical competence to dual tasking/interleaving), and in these tasks many of the ACT-R 4.0 models 
have been genuinely predictive. The transition is empirically progressive because many predictions of 
those models have been corroborated. 
The most recent transition in the ACT series is embodied in ACT-R 5.0. The integration of perception 
and action and the mapping of ACT-R modules and processes to brain structures and regions ensure 
that ACT-R 5.0 makes new predictions. Some of these predictions have already been corroborated (see 
Byrne & Anderson, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004). Changes to the mechanisms governing goals 
introduced in ACT-R 5.0 (i.e., the replacement of a goal stack with a goal buffer and an activation-
based process of goal reconstruction) are also theoretically and empirically progressive because these 
changes yield predictions about goal interference, goal encoding time and goal decay (Altmann & 
Trafton, 2002), all of which have received empirical corroboration. From this perspective, the 
transition to ACT-R 5.0 appears to be both theoretically and empirically progressive. However, it is 
unclear if empirical coverage has been entirely cumulative. For example, are the impressive ACT-R 
4.0 simulation results of the acquisition of numerical competence described by Lebiere & Anderson 
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(1998) retained in ACT-R 5.0, given that versions 4.0 and 5.0 of ACT-R employ substantially 
different approaches to goal maintenance and production learning? If not, theory development is not 
cumulative and the degree to which the most recent transition is progressive must be reassessed. If so, 
ACT-R’s learning mechanism would appear to play a non-critical role in generating predictions about 
the time-course of learning—a counter-intuitive result that leads one to wonder how ACT-R’s account 
of learning might be tested. 
4.3. Conclusion 
Given Anderson’s (1976) theoretical approach, and the clarity with which ACT’s original hard core 
assumptions were specified, it is perhaps not surprising that the development of ACT may be viewed 
as a Lakatosian research programme. The constant attention paid to empirical effects throughout the 
development of ACT has also ensured that the research programme has by and large been both 
theoretically and empirically progressive. (See Figure 1, right.) The picture is not entirely rosy, 
however, as peripheral assumptions have been subject to considerable turbulence throughout the ACT 
series. The role of goals and the nature of the goal stack, for example, have been revised with almost 
every version of the theory. Similarly production selection and more critically learning have also come 
in for repeated revision. This turbulence means that corroborated predictions of early version of ACT 
may not hold within ACT-R 5.0. 
In fact, the recent changes to goal structures are particularly interesting from a Lakatosian perspective 
because they reflect the replacement of a simplifying assumption that allowed substantial theoretical 
development (the goal stack) with a more complex mechanism (activation-based goal reconstruction). 
Given the concern expressed by Anderson about the treatment of goals in earlier theories within the 
ACT research programme, recent work on goals may be viewed as an instance of elaborating a long-
standing simplifying assumption. This form of theory development parallels, for example, the 
replacement in Newton’s work on gravity of simplifying assumptions about point-mass celestial 
bodies orbiting around the centre of the heavier body (which allowed significant theoretical progress 
in some areas of the theory) with more realistic assumptions and principles concerning extended 
bodies orbiting around a common gravitational centre (which were only feasible once Newton had 
sufficiently developed the calculus). Thus, and on the positive side, there is reason to believe that 
recent work may have resolved long-standing questions about the nature of goals and the role of the 
goal stack. 
This positive assessment cannot easily be applied to other sources of flux such as those relating to 
production selection and learning, for in these cases theory change has involved modification to 
mechanisms that are already quite complex (and have not previously been identified as theoretically 
problematic), rather than the elaboration of simplifying assumptions. In addition, the only non-
ambiguously pseudo-scientific progression in the ACT research programme (that reflected in the 1987 
version of ACT*), was concerned entirely with a revision to the learning mechanism. There is 
therefore reason to believe that future revisions of the ACT architecture are likely to witness further 
flux before peripheral hypotheses concerning learning and production selection are incorporated into 
the hard core. 
5. General Discussion and Conclusion 
The preceding case studies demonstrate that while neither Soar nor the ACT series have explicitly 
adopted Lakatosian principles, such principles can be applied to the development of both cognitive 
architectures. In this sense, Newell (1990) was justified in appealing to Lakatosian principles in his 
attempt to defend the scientific credibility of Soar: Soar may indeed be described as a Lakatosian 
research programme. However, the Lakatosian analysis of Soar reveals that it has at times adopted 
pseudo-scientific criteria for theory development. It is therefore not a scientific research programme 
according to the principles of Lakatos (1970). This is not necessarily a critical failing of Soar as an 
engineering enterprise, but given Newell’s appeal to Lakatosian principles it is a critical failing of Soar 
as a scientific theory of the human cognitive architecture. 
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The Lakatosian analysis of the ACT series demonstrates that it too may appeal to Lakatos in order to 
claim scientific credibility. The analysis supports the contention that the ACT series is more scientific 
than Soar (and this contention is reflected in the number of refereed journal articles within the 
psychological literature reporting empirical support for each architecture: over 100 for ACT and none 
for Soar). It might appear then that if Soar is to regain its scientific credibility it should attempt to 
emulate the methodology adopted by the ACT series. However, the ACT series is not a perfect role 
model: some areas of the theory appear to be in constant flux (particularly learning, a critical area of 
the theory). More critically, it remains to be demonstrated that Lakatosian principles are appropriate 
for the development of cognitive architectures. As noted above, Newell’s original motivation for 
invoking Lakatos was to defend Soar against claims that it was unfalsifiable. Newell’s purpose was to 
argue that Soar was a scientific theory, rather than merely a framework or pseudo-scientific belief 
system. Lakatosian principles are not necessarily required to make this argument—other credible 
demarcation criteria would serve just as well. 
An alternative position is to deny that demarcation is an issue. Laudan (1983) does just this, arguing 
that science is “not all cut from the same epistemic cloth” (Laudan, 1983, p. 124), and that the 
demarcation problem is spurious. Laudan’s view is particularly relevant in the current context as his 
notion of a research tradition provides what appears to be a viable alternative to Lakatos’ conception 
of a research programme. Research traditions (Laudan, 1977) lack hard core assumptions, but are 
defined by metaphysical and methodological commitments (i.e., by the entities of their theories and 
the methods of inquiry employed within the tradition). By doing away with hard core assumptions, 
Laudan acknowledges that science (or at least research and theory development) is often not strictly 
cumulative as Lakatos would have us believe. In addition, Laudan notes that “the succession of 
specific theories … involves the elimination as well as the addition of assumptions” (Laudan, 1977, p. 
77). Thus, the elimination of assumptions seen in research on both Soar and the ACT series is, in 
Laudan’s view, common within research traditions, and hence not something that should count against 
the status (scientific or otherwise) of Soar or the ACT series. 
Abandoning demarcation, however, is a significant step that comes at a cost. For example, within a 
Lakatosian framework pseudo-scientific progressions are to be avoided because they undermine the 
scientific status of a theory. The above analysis demonstrates in addition that, at least in the cases of 
Soar and the ACT series, they also correspond to theoretical progressions that, with hindsight, have 
not stood the test of time. What, then, is required of a cognitive architecture if we accept demarcation 
and adopt an explicitly Lakatosian approach to theory development? Essentially, each revision of the 
theory must address five questions: 
1. What are the hard core assumptions and peripheral hypotheses of this version of the theory, 
and how do these relate to those of the previous version of the theory? 
2. What empirical anomalies arising from the previous version of the theory are addressed by the 
revised theory (i.e., what existing empirical findings does this version of the theory account 
for that the previous version did not)? 
3. Are all empirical phenomena that were addressed by the previous version of the theory also 
addressed by the new version? 
4. What empirical phenomena does this version of the theory predict that the previous version 
did not? 
5. What empirical anomalies remain (i.e.. what phenomena remain to be accounted for)? 
The answer to the last of these questions cannot necessarily be stated at the time the revised theory is 
proposed, but the principles require that empirical anomalies are catalogued as the theory is explored, 
for it is these that provide the impetus for theory development. 
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Our analysis has been based on the development of just two cognitive architectures: Soar and ACT-R. 
While it would be instructive to analyse the development of other architectures (e.g., EPIC, 4-CAPS, 
etc.), none have a published history comparable to Soar or the ACT series. The lessons learned from 
this analysis nevertheless may be applied to other cognitive architectures. Thus, while the above 
analysis has concentrated on the issue of science versus pseudo-science through the descriptive 
application of Lakatosian principles, the same principles may be applied prescriptively to help guide 
theoretical progress and ensure positive theoretical growth. We therefore suggest that addressing the 
above five questions with each revision of a cognitive architecture will provide the architecture with 
more consistent, positive, theoretical growth than is currently achieved through the existing practice of 
ad hoc theory development. 
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